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The U.S. shutdown has a hefty international price tag
This week, President Obama cancelled his appearance at the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation summit in Bali, as well as some regional summits – a direct result of the U.S.
government’s shutdown. Peter Trubowitz writes that domestic politics in America is constraining
Obama’s ability to act on the international stage. If the deadlock over the government’s budget
and the debt ceiling continues, then Washington may find that its previous efforts to ‘pivot’
towards Asia have been wasted.
George Washington’s Farewell Address is usually remembered for its admonition to “steer clear
of permanent alliances”. But Washington’s famous words contained a second warning too, one that is especially
apt today: factionalism at home invites trouble abroad. Washington wrote at a time when international events
threatened to destroy the young American republic. The titanic struggle between France and Britain forced
Americans to choose sides: Jeffersonian Republicans aligned with Paris; Hamiltonian Federalists sided with
London. The resulting factional infighting, Washington feared, would leave the country vulnerable to foreign
coercion and intrigue.
Factionalism is once again rife in the US. The Republican-led shutdown of the federal government last week is
but the latest in a series of politically orchestrated crises designed to erode Barack Obama’s domestic legitimacy.
Whatever success Republicans achieve domestically, holding the federal government hostage to an extremist
minority at home is not cost-free internationally.
Today, there is little danger of foreign coercion. Eighteenth century America was an international weakling, which
is why George Washington worried about getting caught in France or Britain’s crosshairs. Yet even 21st century
superpowers must worry about the kind of hyper-factionalism currently on display in the US. It sends a confusing,
self-defeating message to foreign audiences. Nowhere is this clearer, or the risks to American interests greater,
than in Asia.
Worries about America’s
commitment to Asia are not new.
Indeed, they have dogged
Obama since he took office in
2009. Many Asian capitals
viewed his efforts to scale back
America’s presence in Iraq and
Afghanistan as a harbinger of a
broader strategic retrenchment.
At a time when China’s regional
ambitions seemed to be
expanding, Obama’s
preoccupation with domestic
matters, however well
intentioned, only fuelled fears in
Japan and South Korea that
China would take advantage of
the opportunity to extend its
geopolitical reach.
Obama’s tour of Asia in 2010
was described with much fanfare
as a “pivot” in US foreign policy. The trip was meant to reassure Japan, South Korea, and others in the region
that whatever the US did in the Middle East, Europe, or elsewhere, it remained committed to maintaining the
region’s geopolitical status quo and to the security of its longstanding allies. But the pivot (or what the White
House now calls “rebalancing”) has not inspired the depth of support among allies and friends in the region the
administration hoped for. One reason of course is that China has not sat idly by. Beijing has used its economic
clout to parry Washington’s plans for a Trans-Pacific Partnership by offering its neighbours generous lines of
credit. Just this week Chinese leader Xi Jinping proposed to create a regional development bank to invest in
infrastructure in Southeast Asia and pledged funding from China.
Partisanship in Washington has also taken its toll on the success of the pivot in Asia. America’s inability to govern
at home, as Secretary of State John Kerry noted over the weekend, raises doubts about America’s ability to
deliver and encourages others to make “mischief”. “I believe that those standing in the way [of a resolution]”,
Kerry warned, “need to think long and hard about the message that we send to the world when we can’t get our
own act together.”
What matters most to Asian leaders are not token troop deployments, joint military exercises, or regional port
visits. It is whether their own domestic public deems America’s gestures credible. This is why Obama’s decision
to cancel an appearance at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Bali this week has caused
so much consternation in the region. It reinforces the view that Obama cannot deliver internationally – that the
gap between what the President is promising in the way of focused US leadership and what a highly partisan
Congress is willing to deliver has grown too wide.
Forced to choose between appearing indifferent to American voters and looking feckless to his Asian partners,
Obama chose the latter. And therein lies the rub: domestic politics forced the president to trim his international
sails.
To be sure, the fallout from the APEC meetings is containable. This is not the diplomatic fiasco some of Obama’s
critics are making it out to be. But if the governance gap in Washington continues to worsen – a very real
prospect with the October 17 debt-ceiling deadline looming – it will become harder politically for Asian leaders to
consider the United States a strategic bulwark against China or a patron that can reliably outbid the Chinese in
buying regional access and influence. Some Asian leaders may begin to look for ways to accommodate Beijing,
rather than balance against it.
George Washington wrote that partisanship is America’s “worst enemy”. He exaggerated. Strong, competitive
parties are vital to a functioning democracy and to making rational and far-sighted foreign policy. But the kind of
political dysfunction that is currently on display in Washington threatens its ability to lead abroad as well as its
capacity to govern at home. America’s first president must be turning in his grave.
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